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  The Quality of Bioethics Debate: 





Bioethicists have recently expressed concern over a lack of quality 
control within the field. This apprehension focuses on bioethics 
expanding in ways that obscure its distinctive ethical remit and the 
specialist reasoning skills it requires. This thesis about the quality and 
conduct of bioethics may have particular relevance for clinical ethics. 
As one of the youngest offshoots of bioethics, the field focuses on the 
ethical issues that arise specifically in a clinical context. However, non-
ethics specialists are increasingly involved in this field. This means that 
clinical ethics could be especially vulnerable to the quality control 
concerns articulated within bioethics. The growing public profile of 
clinical ethics means that concerns over quality in this area warrant 
specific attention by those concerned with declining standards in 
bioethics and those working in clinical ethics. 
 
 
Quality in Bioethics    
  
A number of bioethics specialists have recently articulated concerns over a 
lack of quality control within the field.1-2 Attention has focussed on the 
implications of viewing bioethics as such a capacious discipline that its 
philosophical (ethical) roots and so its quality, are compromised. It is claimed, 
for example, that once disciplines like medical sociology and law are taken to 
be an integral part of bioethics, there can be confusion over issues such as the 
relationship between legal and ethical thought and difficulty distinguishing 
between description and prescription. Those who have expressed concern 
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about quality in bioethics are not denying the need to inform ethical analysis 
by drawing on the insights of other disciplines or the methodological rigor of 
such disciplines. Rather, effort is being made to emphasise the distinctive 
nature of bioethics; namely, its focus on ‘… advancing and examining 
arguments about what ought, morally, to be done and not done – about what 
is (actually, rather than merely thought to be) right and wrong.’1 
 
The problems associated with understanding bioethics as a broad discipline 
are, it is claimed, compounded by a one-way ‘disciplinary slip’ that leads to 
the acceptance of experts in other disciplines working in bioethics without 
sufficient training in the philosophical methods required to perform ethical 
analysis in a sophisticated manner. Benatar explains that this problem is 
influenced by the fact that the expertise of philosophers is frequently 
undervalued. In this respect, the increasing importance of bioethics to 
professionals in other fields actually spurs the decline in standards. This, 
Benatar suggests, is because the growing interest in bioethics is rarely filled 
by those who are actually bioethics specialists, but by a band of often self-
appointed ethics ‘experts’ drawn from an array of other specialisms.1 
 
The decline in bioethics quality, it is suggested, is occurring in both 
publication and pedagogy. In respect of publication, papers with significant 
bioethics components appear in the professional journals of disciplines that 
rarely have their ethical content assessed by those with philosophical training; 
 4 
and journals dedicated to ethics increasingly contain surveys with very little, 
if any ethics.1-2 In terms of pedagogy, the desire of, for example, healthcare 
professionals to acquire training in bioethics means that ’… the audience for 
much bioethics writing and talk are people who, because they are not trained 
in philosophy, are much less discerning about what constitutes good 
philosophy’.1 As Benatar laments ‘… a brief course or diploma is thought 
sufficient to transform a novice into a so-called “ethicist”, “bioethicist” or, 
worse still, a bioethics educator’.1 Together, these concerns lead to fears that 
the failure to ground bioethics sufficiently in philosophical ethics will result in 
an empty brand of ‘non-ethics bioethics’.2 
 
These recent comments about quality in bioethics are part of debates on 
ethical expertise and the relationship between ethics and disciplines such as 
social science.3 Yet reading these concerns about the quality, conduct and 
integrity of ethics in the context of initiatives to help support clinical ethics in 
the United Kingdom (UK) gives such issues added significance.  
 
Within the UK, clinical ethics committees (CECs) represent an increasingly 
popular way of responding to ethical issues within clinical care.4 If the growth 
of CECs continues, they and clinical ethics may become the form of bioethics 
with the greatest civic influence. Indeed, support for committees is growing in 
the UK despite caveats over their performance.5-6 Questions about the value 
and quality of ethics services raised in the UK are part of larger international 
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debates.7-8 This paper will investigate how concerns regarding quality in 
bioethics apply to clinical ethics and CECs and consider the implications of 
these issues for the development of ethics services in the UK.   
 
Clinical Ethics: Its Nature and Aims 
 
 
Clinical ethics is a relatively recent offshoot of bioethics.9-10 The field emerged 
from a move within bioethics to respond directly to the challenge of doing 
‘ethics at the bedside’.11 Fletcher and Siegler have summarised the central 
goals of the field thus: facilitating the resolution of conflicts by identifying 
and supporting the ‘interests, rights and responsibilities of those involved’; 
helping to generate policies and practices ‘consistent with ethical norms and 
standards’; and helping individuals address ‘ethical problems by providing 
education in healthcare ethics’.12 More simply, clinical ethics services tend to 
divide their time between three enterprises: case consultation, policy advice 
and education (both self-education, and training of those external to the 
committee).13-14 
 
The issues examined within clinical ethics and by CECs are those traditionally 
associated with medical ethics including: consent, competency, the 
distribution of resources, decisions regarding treatment at the beginning and 
end of life and genetic testing. The distinctive identity of clinical ethics comes 
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from the environment in which it takes place and the way in which it 
juxtaposes clinical and ethical skills. As Fletcher et al. note: 
 
For the word ethics in its name to ring true, clinical ethics must 
authentically bridge between the clinical world and the 
theoretical disciplines of bioethics and medical humanities in 
the academic world….15 
 
Given that accurate empirical data plays a key role within applied ethics, it 
would be easy to assume that efforts to bridge between clinical practice and 
ethical theory are easily accomplished. Yet the identity of clinical ethics is, as 
Jonsen has stated, ambiguous.16 This ambiguity means that clinical ethics 
tends to be regarded as either a medical discipline conducted by healthcare 
professionals, or a theoretical enterprise staffed by philosophers and 
theologians.16 When it is associated primarily with healthcare its ethical 
credentials become dubious. The field has, for example, been described as a 
‘branch of medicine’.17 Similar characterisations include claims that: ‘the field 
of biomedical ethics, now has a clinical discipline (ethics consultation)’;18 and 
‘clinical ethics is a field of expertise in healthcare, rather than a separate field, 
discipline or profession’.19 It is questionable whether accounts of clinical ethics 
that identify it primarily as a clinical practice will give sufficient attention to 
the ethical methods that should also be at the heart of such work. As a result 
conceptualising clinical ethics as a medical discipline may have a detrimental 
impact on its ethical identity and quality. 
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Another possible outcome of viewing clinical ethics as a medical discipline is 
that ethical issues will not be identified or addressed at all. As Murray has 
stated in relation to the situation in the United States:   
 
… ‘ethics’ per se does not have a primary role in committee discussions 
of concrete cases. It is commonly said that clarifying the facts and 
fostering communication comprise upwards of 80 to 90 percent of their 
work.20 
 
However, if ethics committees operate under the false assumption that their 
role is accomplished by addressing such issues, then ethical issues they were 
formed to address are unlikely to receive the attention they merit. As a result 
the quality of care provided may be undermined if the ethical interests of 
patients and professionals are overlooked by the services intended to protect 
them. 
 
The concerns over the issues and approaches that are used within clinical 
ethics also extend to research in the field. Singer, Siegler and Pellegrino have 
identified that clinical ethics research tends to be either theoretical or 
empirical in nature.21 Theoretical research ‘employs the methods of logical 
reasoning and argument. It is founded on the principles of philosophical and 
theological ethics, law, or public policy.’21 This description of theoretical 
research includes methods of working associated with health ethics. The same 
is not true of empirical clinical ethics research that uses ‘…  methods of the 
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social sciences, decision analysis, clinical epidemiology, and health services 
research…’ 21 
 
Empirical data is imperative to informed ethical analysis. This leads 
publications like the Journal of Medical Ethics to publish a high percentage of 
empirically based studies within its section dedicated to ‘clinical ethics’.  
Empirical studies play an important role in helping to identify how CECs are 
developing and the issues that dominate the field of clinical ethics, such as the 
type of work that occupies clinical ethicists, their subject specialisms and their 
level of ethical training.4 That said, analysis based on social science methods is 
not itself a form of ethical reasoning, so taking empirical research to be a part 
of clinical ethics risks creating confusion over the goals of the field.   
 
The medico-empirical focus of some accounts of clinical ethics and ethics 
consultation appear, perhaps inadvertently, to sanction the ‘disciplinary slip’ 
identified within bioethics.1-2 This concern over the ethical content and quality 
of clinical ethics is greatly influenced by who is responsible for conducting 
such work.   
 
Clinical Ethics: Its Practitioners 
 
 
Jonsen explains that clinical ethics emerged in the United States from the 
perception of medics and ‘physician-educators’ that clinical work could 
benefit from engaging directly with whose primary training was in 
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theological or philosophical ethics.16 The immersion of professional ethicists in 
clinical environments is reported to have created discomfort amongst these 
philosophical trail-blazers, as one remarks: 
 
Our reaction often was that this is simply no place for a philosopher, 
whose training and disposition include nothing that could prepare one 




At the same time as philosophers were being invited to work on real ethical 
issues within clinical settings, healthcare professionals were also trying to get 
to grips with ethics themselves so they could address the dilemmas that they 
faced on a day-to-day basis. Sulmasy explains that while medical ethics is 
thought to have emerged in the 1960s: 
   
… truly clinical ethics began later, as the philosophers and 
theologians moved into the professional schools, onto the 
wards, and into the clinics. Clinical ethics also emerged as 
clinicians themselves began to pursue training and education in 
ethics, began to teach, do research, perform consults…23 
 
As clinical ethics resources have developed in the US, professional ethicists 
and healthcare professionals have come to staff a variety of services. There are 
full multidisciplinary ethics committees, small ‘quick-response’ emergency 
teams – perhaps part of a larger committee – individual ethics consultants 
(usually professional ethicists) and no doubt other manifestations that fulfil 
local needs. Similar developments have occurred in the UK, although it seems 
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that the primary – though not exclusive - form of ethics consultation service is 
the multidisciplinary committee.4 The development of such committees has 
been perceived as way to provide the wide-range of expertise needed to 
address ethical dilemmas within clinical care. In order for ethical issues to be 
identified and addressed in a sophisticated manner by CECs, ethical skills 
must be sufficiently represented amongst the members of such committees.  
 
A number of empirical studies have examined the constitution of CECs in 
both the US and UK and found a low percentage of committee members are 
ethics specialists. The same studies have also found relatively low levels of 
ethics training amongst members with a different subject specialism.4, 24-26 
Furthermore, Benatar’s concerns about the short training programmes that 
litter the field of bioethics are also relevant within clinical ethics.1 The growth 
of ‘kwik-fit’ clinical ethics courses targeted at the members of CECs, risk 
giving insufficient training to equip professionals with adequate analytical 
skills for their role on committees.27 In addition, they give the impression that 
clinical ethics – and perhaps health ethics more generally - is a discipline that 
can be taught easily and quickly, so underestimating the skills required.1 
 
Clinical ethics committees epitomize the broad, multidisciplinary brand of 
ethics - often performed by non-ethics specialists - that bioethicists have 
critiqued for its poor quality.1-2 As a result committees may not be equipped to 
perform the increasingly prominent role they have within health ethics. CECs 
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must take greater account of the ethics specialisation required by their remit. 
In this respect it appears indisputable that philosophical ethics should have a 
prominent role within this work. However, the very development of CECs 
suggests that other, more philosophical expressions of health ethics (including 
bioethics) are not perceived as providing an adequate response to the ethical 
issues that arise in clinical care. This raises questions over the assumption that 
philosophy provides the solution to quality concerns in bioethics and the 
work of CECs. 
 
The Pursuit of Ethical Quality: The Role of Philosophical Ethics   
 
Doubts have been expressed within philosophy over the ability of 
philosophical ethics to provide an adequate response to practical dilemmas 
within healthcare.28-30 Beauchamp, for example, has suggested that rather than 
being closely connected, the relationship between bioethics and moral theory 
is ‘contingent and fragile’.29 Given the greater practical focus of clinical ethics, 
its relationship with moral theory will arguably be even more tenuous. The 
practical abilities of bioethics have also been criticised by social scientists who 
contend that this ‘purportedly interdisciplinary’ field has often 
overemphasised the importance of philosophical skills.3  More specifically, it is 
claimed that bioethics is over reliant on abstract, idealised reasoning and, 
therefore, gives insufficient attention to the practical and socio-cultural 
dimensions of contemporary ethical dilemmas.31 
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This widespread concern over the practical abilities of philosophy suggests 
that calls to place ‘good philosophy’ at the heart of applied ethics to improve 
its quality may not be good enough when it comes to responding to practical 
dilemmas in clinical care. Thus, ways must be found to integrate ethics 
specialisation more successfully within interdisciplinary exchanges without 
allowing bioethics to become and even greater free for all. To secure a more 
consistent commitment to ethics specialisation it is important for ethicists to 
clearly articulate that the role of ethical analysis is to test the consistency of 
arguments and identify flawed logic or dubious premises as part of its pursuit 
to determine the right or best way for humans to live.  This is because one of 
the greatest obstacles to the quality of ethical work in healthcare is that its 
very nature and aims are misunderstood by other disciplines. In this respect, 
clinical ethics is particularly badly affected and social scientists have been key 
offenders. 
 
De Vries, for example, argues that social science ’… allows bioethicists to see 
if their contributions to the biosciences are making a difference, if bioethics – 
measured on its own terms – is a success.’32 To illustrate how social science 
performs this important role De Vries points to studies that employ criteria 
such as user satisfaction and the reduction of non-beneficial treatment to help 
gauge the success of ethics services.33, 34 Although it is admittedly important 
that service users are happy with the service they receive from a CEC – or 
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they may not use it, or recommend it in the future - satisfaction is not a safe 
measure of ethical quality. High levels of satisfaction may, for example, 
signify no more that medics or patients getting their own way due to the 
impotence of a CEC.  There are also problems with the way other empirical 
measures, such as the reduction of non-beneficial treatment and quantity, 
assess ethics. 35 
 
De Vries and the authors of such studies fail to appreciate that these empirical 
outcome measures are not in fact measuring ethics ‘on its own terms’, but 
essentially miscast ethics as an empirical discipline. It is ironic that De Vries 
claims that these social science studies produce ‘friendly, useful criticism’ that 
shows ethics services ‘do not have the desired effect’ so resulting in the 
‘implicit criticism of bioethics’.32 In fact the studies have little to say about 
bioethics because their inaccurate characterisation of it means this is not what 
they are assessing. While critiques of bioethics are so misguided it is difficult 





It would be unfortunate if the multidisciplinary constitution of CECs 
automatically leads to such bodies being censured for their dubious ethical 
credentials. To avoid this charge, committees must prioritise their pursuit and 
maintenance of ethics training. This will involve ethics services and ethicists 
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working together to create training programmes that are more substantial, 
robust and beneficial to the day-to-day work of CECs.  It must be constantly 
borne in mind that committees are not just a forum for discussing the facts of 
a particular case and the normative values that surround it, but must also 
have critical teeth to allow them to dissect flawed reasoning that may be used 
(perhaps inadvertently) either to support bad practice or to prevent much 
needed developments within clinical practice. To fulfil these tasks ethical and 
not only empirical training is required. 
 
Instead of comfortably stating and restating doubts about the ethical abilities 
of non-specialists in bioethics and CECs, ethicists must find ways to promote 
(and protect) the role their discipline has to play in clinical environments and 
civic life. In this respect, ethicists must champion their discipline by fearlessly 
seeking to enable other willing-hands to ‘do’ ethics in a manner that can 
influence practice. The only form of ethical protectionism suited to our times 
is that of genuine engagement and facilitation.  
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